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The paper surveys more than forty characterizations of scoring methods for pref-
erence aggregation and contains one new result. A general scoring operator is
self-consistent if alternative i is assigned a greater score than j whenever i gets no
worse (better) results of comparisons and its ‘opponents’ are assigned respectively
greater (no smaller) scores than those of j. We prove that self-consistency is sat-
isfied if and only if the application of a scoring operator reduces to the solution
of a homogeneous system of algebraic equations with a monotone function on the
left-hand side.
Subject classification: AMS(MOS) 90A07, 90A10, 90A28, 90-02.
Keywords: aggregation of preferences, scoring procedures, ranking, choice,
Borda score, characterization, paired comparisons, utilitarianism
1 Introduction
Scoring procedures transform profiles of individual preferences over a set of alternatives
into scores of the alternatives. The scores can be used in themselves or serve as the
basis for ranking or choice. For the present, only a few scoring procedures are endowed
with their axiomatic characterizations. At the same time, a large number of ingenious
procedures are advocated and used in such disciplines as management science, operations
research, psychometrics, applied statistics, processing of sport tournaments, graph theory,
etc. Very few social choice papers deal with them. The aim of this paper is to take
one circumspect step toward an axiomatic framework for comparing the merits of these
elaborate procedures. As a result, we would like to isolate a family of scoring procedures
that comprises a majority of ‘reasonable’ procedures (so that the further axioms could be
imposed on this family). Two main approaches are applicable. The first one is to express
the desired properties axiomatically, the second is to gather the existing procedures and
specify their common algebraic form. We use both, and their results are concordant: A
∗This work was supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research Grant No. 96-01-01010.
Partial research support from the European Community under Grant ACE-91-R02 is also grate-
fully acknowledged. The authors thank Anna Khmelnitskaya for some bibliographic suggestions
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scoring procedure satisfies the axiom of self-consistency if and only if it has a monotone
implicit form.
To circumscribe the variety of axioms that have already been used in the literature
(and which can be adapted for the family of procedures isolated here), we survey a number
of characterizations of scoring methods.
The paper is organized as follows. After the main notation (Section 2), we give
a review of some papers that characterize scoring methods for preference aggregation
(Section 3), introduce the notions of self-consistency (Section 4) and monotone implicit
form (Section 5), and prove our theorem (Section 6).
2 Main notation
Let A = (A(1), . . . , A(m)) be a profile of individual preferences over the set of alternatives
X = {1, . . . , n}. Herem is the number of individuals andA(p), p = 1, . . . ,m, represents the
preferences of the pth individual. In classical papers, A(p) are linear orders. Here we would
like to involve several other settings as well, where equivalencies are allowed or transitivity
is not assumed or even degrees of preference are reported. Namely, A(p) = (apij) is a
completely defined matrix of paired comparisons, where for i 6= j, apij ∈ [0, 1], a
p
ij+a
p
ji = 1
and apii = 0 (although a
p
ii = 0 are not used in the paper). When only strict preferences
are allowed, apij ∈ {0, 1}, otherwise a
p
ij = a
p
ji = 1/2 means equivalence; in some settings
apij ∈ [0, 1] is interpreted as the part of a unit preference or probability that is assigned to
i in comparison with j (in turn apji = 1 − a
p
ij is assigned to j). Transitivity may or may
not be assumed.
The constraint apij + a
p
ji = 1 may seem to be unduly restrictive, but we believe
it is not. In this setting, apij and a
p
ji are not independent comparison outcomes, but
rather two complementary evaluations of the same outcome. That is why their relation
merely characterizes the method of evaluation. Monotone transformations take them to
other popular types of data, e.g., exponential transformations ψ give ψ(apij) · ψ(a
p
ji) =
const, which is typical of the analytical hierarchy framework. Yet, as was noticed by
an anonymous referee, the theorem in Section 6 is adaptable for the case with mutually
independent apij and a
p
ji too.
Letting some restrictions on A(p) (or on A as a whole) be imposed, suppose A is the
set of all admissible preference profiles with given n (the number of alternatives) and m
(the number of individuals). In Sections 4–6, n and m are fixed. Let M = {1, . . . ,m},
Xi = {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n}, i = 1, . . . , n.
A scoring operator or scoring procedure is a function ϕ : A → Rn, where ϕ(A) =
(s1, . . . , sn), si being a score (or weight, etc.) assigned to alternative i. ‘Scores’ are
often associated with total points, however, a number of papers consider scores as general
weights as in this definition, see, e.g., [53, 23]. Let scoring methods be the generic term
for scoring operators and procedures of ranking/choice based on them.
The review in the following section involves a number of results that deal with social
utility (welfare) functions. There is no essential difference between them and the scores
si, however, we do not find it natural to give them a common designation. So, we hold si
for scores derived from paired comparisons and v(i) (or v(x), x ∈ X) for social utilities.
Individual utilities will be denoted by v1(x), . . . , vm(x), x ∈ X .
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3 Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods
Some papers that characterize scoring methods are presented in Table 1 (Parts 1 to 6).
They are ordered chronologically (up to years), and every column can be used to classify
the results. Characterizations of scoring procedures that have the form of product are not
included, since their theory is entirely parallel to that of additive procedures (see, e.g.,
[43, 38, 64, 5]). We use six standard abbreviations: N for neutrality, A for anonymity,
M for monotonicity, IIA and NIIA for Arrow’s and Nash’s independences of irrelevant
alternatives, and P for the strong Pareto principle (‘weak P’ designates the weak Pareto
principle).
3.1 Resulting preference structures
Let us start with the third column. The scores of alternatives can be used in themselves,
for ranking or choice. So the results are classified as ones characterizing:
• Ranking procedures based on scores. They may provide:
– Weak order [40, 61, 31, 62, 42, 79, 30, 2, 58, 27, 86, 71, 70, 67, 49, 85, 8, 55].
– Weak order over all admissible or feasible vectors of individual utilities/scores
or on an extension of X [43, 7].
– Partial order [30, 10].
• Choice procedures based on scores (alternatives with the highest score are chosen).
Table 1 contains procedures that provide:
– Choice set [83, 84, 45, 35, 69, 29, 63, 85, 72, 66].
– Several variants of choice set with k members [24]. (It is interesting to compare
Debord’s result with another approach to the committee selection advocated
and characterized in [11] and also based on the Borda scores.)
– Choice from a set of admissible or feasible vectors of individual utilities/scores
or from an extension of X [65, 64].
– Choice function that attaches a nonempty choice set to every subset of X
[34, 49, 3, 9, 28].
• Procedures resulting in scores, measures of social welfare, utility, etc., possibly on
an extended set of alternatives [46, 51, 4, 12, 6, 15, 56].
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Table 1
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods (Part 1)
Paper
Input
preferences
Resulting
(social)
structure
Most important
axioms
Result of the method
Fleming [40] m weak orders weak order P, independence of
locally unaffected
individuals
ranking by the sum of
arbitrary utilities that
represent individual orders
Goodman,
Markowitz
[43]
A set X˜ ⊂ R
m
of admissible
utility vectors
v = (v1,...,vm)
(including the
discrete case)
weak order
on X˜
a. P
b. independence of
the individual zeros,
A + ‘a.’
ranking by:
a. W (v1,...,vm) with
arbitrary increasing
W : R
m → R
b.
∑m
p=1
vp
Blackwell,
Girshick [7]
A set X˜ ⊂ R
m
of feasible
utility vectors
v = (v1,...,vm)
weak order
on X˜
strengthened IIA,
nonstrict Pareto
preference,
independence of the
individual zeros
ranking by
∑m
p=1
αp vp,
αp ≥ 0, p = 1,...,m
or total indifference
Milnor [61] m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X
weak order strengthened IIA, N,
A, weak P,
independence of the
individual zeros
ranking by
∑m
p=1
vp
Harsanyi
[46]
m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X˜ ,
X˜ being the
set of lotteries
over X
utility
function
v(x),
x ∈ X˜
a. Pareto indifference,
von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility
axioms
b. nonstrict Pareto
preference + ‘a.’
a. v(x) =
∑m
p=1
αp vp(x)+β,
with some α1,...,αm, β ∈ R
b. ‘a.’ with αp ≥ 0,
p = 1,...,m
Fishburn
[31]
m weak orders weak order Pareto principle for
equicardinal subsets
ranking by the sum of
arbitrary utilities that
represent individual orders
Morkeliu¯nas
[62]
m weak orders weak order N, relaxations of IIA,
weak versions of
reinforcement, A, P
a. factored Borda ordering
b. extended Borda ordering
Ga¨rdenfors
[42]
a. m linear
orders
b. m weak
orders
weak order 0. N, summability
a. weak P, strong
positional
independence + ‘0.’
b. strong M, stability
+ ‘0.’
a. Borda ordering
b. extended Borda ordering
P. Yu. Chebotarev and E. Shamis / Characterizations of scoring methods 5
Table 1
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods (Part 2)
Paper
Input
preferences
Resulting
(social)
structure
Most important
axioms
Result of the method
Smith [79] m linear orders weak order a. reinforcement, N
b. overwhelming
majority + ‘a.’
a. composite point
ordering
b. point ordering
Fishburn
[34]
m partial
orders
choice
function
a. Pareto principle for
equicardinal subsets
b.,c. versions of A +‘a.’
d. N + ‘c.’
a. choice by the sum of
arbitrary utilities that
weakly represent
individual orders and may
depend on the feasible set
and the profile
b.–d. more symmetric
versions of ‘a.’
Fine, Fine
[30]
m weak orders a.,b.,e.
weak order
c.,d.
partial
order
0. symmetry,
elimination, M
a. N, contraction +
strong ‘0.’
b. overwhelming
majority + ‘a.’
c. intersection of all
point orderings
d. weakest rule to
satisfy dissolution + ‘0.’
e. N, inversion,
independence of extreme
alternatives + strong ‘0.’
a. transfinite point
ordering
b. point ordering
c.,d. partial ordering of
permuted dominance
e. Borda ordering
Young [83] m linear orders choice set reinforcement, N,
cancellation, faithfulness
Borda choice
Young [84] m linear orders choice set a. reinforcement, N, A
b. overwhelming
majority + ‘a.’
a. composite point choice
b. point choice
Hansson,
Sahlquist
[45]
m linear orders choice set (another proof of
Young’s [83] result)
Borda choice
Keeney [51] m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X
utility
function
v(x),
x ∈ X
expected utility
assumption, a version of
IIA, M, non-dictatorship
a. v(x) =
∑m
p=1
αp vp(x),
with αp ≥ 0, p = 1,...,m,
αp > 0 for at least two p’s
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Table 1
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods (Part 3)
Paper
Input
preferences
Resulting
(social)
structure
Most important
axioms
Result of the method
d’Aspremont,
Gevers [2]
m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X
weak order IIA, P, independence of
the individual zeros and
common unit, A
ranking by
∑m
p=1
vp(x)
(utilitarianism)
Maskin [58] m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X
weak order a. IIA, P, continuity
b. independence of
generally unconcerned
individuals + ‘a.’
c. A + ‘b.’
d. independence of the
common zero and unit
of utility + ‘c.’
ranking by:
a. W (v1(x),...,vm(x))
with continuous W
b.
∑m
p=1
wp(vp(x)) with
continuous w1,...,wm
c.
∑m
p=1
w(vp(x)) with
continuous & increasing w
d.
∑m
p=1
vp(x)
Deschamps,
Gevers [27]
m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X
weak order IIA, P, minimal equity,
independence of
generally unconcerned
individuals, A,
independence of the
common zero and unit
ranking by
∑m
p=1
vp(x)
Fishburn
[35]
m choice sets choice set N, reinforcement,
disjoint equality
choice set of approval
voting (a special case of
factored Borda choice)
Young,
Levenglick
[86]
m linear orders a number
of linear
orders
reinforcement, N, the
order of immediately
successive alternatives
obeys majority vote
Kemeny median
Richelson
[69]
m linear orders choice set N, reinforcement, A,
independence of Pareto
dominated alternatives
plurality choice
Farkas,
Nitzan [29]
m linear orders choice set closeness to unanimity Borda choice
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Table 1
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods (Part 4)
Paper
Input
preferences
Resulting
(social)
structure
Most important
axioms
Result of the method
Barbera [4] m linear orders scores1 a. N, A, strategy-
proofness
b. separability of
individual influences
+ ‘a.’
c. a relaxed IIA + ‘a.’
d. ‘b.’ + ‘c.’
a. a convex combination of
point scores and lobby size
scores2
b. point scores2
c. lobby size scores2
d. extended Borda scores2
Rubinstein
[71]
a tournament weak order a relaxed IIA, N,
strong M
Copeland ordering
Roberts [70] m utility
functions
v1(x),...,vm(x),
x ∈ X
weak order 0. IIA, weak P
a. weak continuity +
‘0.’
b. independence of
the common unit of
utility + ‘0.’
c. independence of
generally unconcerned
individuals + ‘b.’
d. independence of
the common zero of
utility + ‘b.’
e. independence of
the individual zeros of
utility + ‘b.’
ranking by:
a. W (v1(x),...,vm(x)) with
W continuous and
increasing
b. W (v1(x),...,vm(x)) with
W homothetic and
increasing
c. signβ
∑m
p=1
αp(vp(x))
β,
β 6= 0 or
∑m
p=1
αp log(vp(x))
d. v¯(x) +W (v1(x)−
v¯(x),...,vm(x)− v¯(x)), with
v¯(x) = 1/m
∑m
p=1
vp(x) and
W homogeneous of degree 1
e.
∑m
p=1
αp vp(x) with
αp > 0, p = 1,...,m
Nitzan,
Rubinstein
[67]
m tournaments weak order reinforcement, N,
strong M, cancellation
extended Borda ordering
Myerson
[65]
a closed,
convex and
comprehensive3
set X˜ of utility
vectors
v = (v1,...,vm)
utility
vector v∗
in X˜
weak P, linearity
w.r.t. sets X˜ (can be
replaced by additivity
w.r.t. sets [64])
choice of
v∗ = (v∗1 ,...,v
∗
m) ∈ X˜ to
maximize
∑m
p=1
αp vp with
arbitrary fixed (α1,...,αm):
every αp ≥ 0,
∑m
p=1
αp = 1
1Nonnegative scores that sum to 1 (distributions over X)
2The scores are normalized so as to make up a distribution over X
3A set V ⊂ R
m is comprehensive iff x ∈ V and y ≤ x (this means yp ≤ xp for every
p = 1, . . . ,m) together imply that y ∈ V
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Table 1
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods (Part 5)
Paper
Input
preferences
Resulting
(social)
structure
Most important
axioms
Result of the method
Morkeliu¯nas
[63]
m weak orders choice set 0. reinforcement, N
a. independence of
Pareto dominated
alternatives + ‘0.’
b. independence of the
Pareto inferior alternative,
duality + ‘0.’
a. generalized
plurality choice
b. factored Borda
choice
Henriet [49] a connected
relation
a. weak
order
b.,c. choice
function
0. N, strong M
a.,b. independence of
cycles + ‘0.’
c. a relaxed IIA + ‘0.’
a. Copeland ordering
b.,c. relative
Copeland choice
function
Young [85] balanced
paired
comparisons
without ties
a. choice set
b. a number
of linear
orders
a. N, reinforcement,
weak unanimity
b. local IIA + ‘a.’
a. extended Borda
choice
b. Kemeny median
Moulin [64] a closed,
convex and
comprehensive4
set X˜ ⊂ R
m of
utility vectors
v = (v1,...,vm)
utility vector
v∗ in X˜
NIIA, P, A, commutativity
with translations
choice of
v∗ = (v∗1 ,...,v
∗
m) ∈ X˜
to maximize
∑m
p=1
vp
Chebotarev
[12, 15]
m skew-
symmetric
incomplete
matrices of
paired
comparisons
scores coincidence with extended
Borda scores for complete
paired comparisons,
implicit form of scores
generalized row sums
Saari [72] m linear orders choice set relaxed versions of
Young’s [83] axioms
Borda choice
Barzilai,
Golany [6]
a skew-
symmetric
matrix (aij) of
paired
comparisons
scores N, additivity, recovery of
s ∈ R
n such that
aij = si−sj , i, j = 1,...,n
(whenever s exists)
normalized extended
Borda scores
Baigent, Xu
[3]
m choice
functions
choice
function
N, M, independence of
symmetric substitutions
choice function of
approval voting
4See footnote 3
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Table 1
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods (Part 6)
Paper
Input
preferences
Resulting
(social)
structure
Most important
axioms
Result of the method
Debord [24] m binary
relations5
a number
of k-choice
sets
reinforcement, N,
cancellation, faithfulness
k-sets with maximal total
extended Borda score
Bouyssou
[8]
a valued
relation
weak order N, strong M,
independence of circuits
extended Borda ordering
Bouyssou
[9]
a valued
relation
choice
function
N, strong M,
independence of circuits
relative extended Borda
choice function
Bouyssou,
Perny [10]
a valued
relation
partial
order
relaxed N, strong M,
independence of
alternated cycles
meet of down-sided and
up-sided Borda orderings
Duggan [28] m weak orders choice
function
N, weak P, A, a rank
version of independence
of the individual zeros
absolute down-sided
Borda choice function
Myerson
[66]
m arbitrary
ballots
choice set a relaxed N, A,
reinforcement,
overwhelming majority
choice of alternatives
maximizing the sum of
arbitrary scores
determined by
individuals’ ballots
Marchant
[55]
m valued
relations6
weak order N, reinforcement,
cancellation, faithfulness
extended Borda ordering
Marchant
[56]
a. m valued
relations6
b. m rational
valued
relations6
scores 0. N, cancellation,
faithfulness
a. reinforcement + ‘0.’
b. a relaxed
reinforcement + ‘0.’
a.,b. extended Borda
scores up to a positive
affine transformation
5The set of admissible relations contains all linear orders and is stable to transpositions
6The values are from [0, 1] (fuzzy relations). The set of admissible relations contains all
crisp weak orders and is stable to transpositions and permutations
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3.2 Input preferences
The form of input information also varies:
• Typically, it is a profile of classical individual preferences:
– Linear orders [42, 79, 83, 84, 45, 86, 69, 29, 72].
– Weak orders [40, 31, 62, 42, 30, 63, 28].
– Individuals’ scores, points, marks, cardinal utilities [43, 7, 61, 46, 51, 2, 58, 27,
70, 65, 64].
– Choice sets [35].
• The preferences in the profile may have more general forms:
– Partial orders [34].
– Tournaments [67].
– Arbitrary binary relations [24] (see also footnote 5).
– Valued (fuzzy) relations [55, 56] (see footnote 6).
– Incomplete skew-symmetric matrices of paired comparisons (in other words,
skew-symmetric valued relations with incomparability distinguished from zero
values) [12, 15].
– Choice functions [3].
– Arbitrary individual ballots [66].
• In some papers, the initial preferences are represented by a single relation (which
may be thought of as a majority relation or other function of the individual profile):
– Tournament [71].
– Connected relation [49].
– Valued relation [8, 9, 10].
– Skew-symmetric matrix of paired comparisons [6].
• Young [85] aggregates a series of paired comparisons without ties, where every
alternative is involved in the same number of comparisons.
3.3 The most important axioms
Many of the following axioms are applied in slightly varying versions in different papers.
Therefore we prefer to give their main ideas rather than exact formulations. Some axioms
are renamed for the sake of unification.
Variable electorate axioms. Reinforcement for choice procedures states that if A
and A′ are disjoint preference profiles, A+A′ is the combined profile and C(A) is the
choice set for A, then C(A+A′) = C(A)
⋂
C(A′) whenever C(A)
⋂
C(A′) 6= ∅. The
same condition expresses reinforcement for procedures that generate a number of orders;
here C(A) denotes the set of these orders. For ranking procedures, reinforcement states
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that if i is socially no worse than j for bothA andA′, then this is the case forA+A′ (with
strict social preference for A or A′ implying strictness for A+A′). Reinforcement for
scoring procedures means that every alternative’s score for A+A′ is the sum of its scores
for A and A′, i.e., it reduces to a kind of additivity. Obviously, this axiom coincides with
the following one if they both are applied to matrices of summarized paired comparisons.
Additivity for scoring procedures that operate on paired comparison matrices means
that the sum of two matrices is mapped to the sum of score vectors derived from these
matrices.
The following two axioms are ‘dual’ to reinforcement.
Elimination says that if i is socially no worse than j for A+A′ and i is socially
equivalent to j for A, then i is socially no worse than j for A′.
Strong elimination says that if i is socially no worse than j forA+A′ and j is socially
no worse than i for A, then i is socially no worse than j for A′.
Overwhelming majority for choice procedures states that whenever C(A) = {i}, then
for any A′ there is an integer k∗ such that C(kA+A′) = {i} for all k ≥ k∗. Here kA
is the profile consisting of k copies of A. Overwhelming majority for ranking procedures
results if we replace choice by social binary preferences.
Contraction, in the case of procedures that produce weak orders, says that the social
ordering for A coincides with that for kA.
Disjoint equality says that if there are only two individuals, their individual choice
sets X1 and X2 are nonempty (which is not generally assumed), and X1 ∩X2 = ∅, then
X1 ∪X2 is exactly the social choice. This axiom is important for characterizing approval
voting [35]. Another related axiomatization is given in [36].
Faithfulness states that in the case of only one individual having a linear order,
her top ranked alternative/alternatives constitute the social choice/k-choice (respectively,
individual’s weak order is taken as the social one or is concordant with the social scores).
This natural condition is a variable electorate axiom of positive relation between
individual and social preferences. Other axioms of this kind follow.
Axioms of positive relation between individual and social preferences.
Monotonicity (‘M’ in Table 1) says that if some alternative becomes more favorite in
one individual opinion, whereas all other alternatives get no rise, then it does not be-
come worse in the social preference. Slightly varying formulations of strong monotonicity
(‘strong M’ in Table 1) additionally require that this alternative leave behind the alter-
natives that were socially indifferent to it.
The following axiom restricts the positive response of the social preference.
Suppose that some individual p only changes x ≺ p y to x ∼ p y or x ∼ p y to x ≻ p y
and others change nothing. Stability applies to the procedures that transform profiles of
weak orders to social weak orders and says that in no above situation the social weak
order can change x ≺ z to x ≻ z with any z 6= y.
Pareto indifference says that everyone being indifferent between two alternatives im-
plies social indifference between them.
Pareto preference says that if no individual strictly prefers j to i and at least one
strictly prefers i to j, then i is strictly socially preferred to j.
Nonstrict Pareto preference says that if no individual prefers j to i, then the society
cannot strictly prefer j to i.
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Strong Pareto principle (‘P’ in Table 1) is the conjunction of Pareto indifference and
Pareto preference.
Weak Pareto principle says that if all individuals strictly prefer i to j then so does
the society.
To introduce the following axiom, suppose  is a weak order on the set of alternatives
X and ∼ is its indifference part. We say that a subset of alternatives X1 ⊆ X is superior
(equivalent) to X2 ⊆ X w.r.t.  iff cardX1 = cardX2 and there exists a one-to-one
correspondence ω from X1 onto X2 such that ω(i1) = i2 implies i1  i2 (resp., i1 ∼ i2).
Strict superiority means superiority and not equivalence. Pareto principle for equicardinal
subsets says that whenever X1 is superior to X2 w.r.t. every individual’s weak order, then
X2 cannot be strictly superior toX1 w.r.t. the social weak order. If, in addition, X1 is not
equivalent to X2 w.r.t. at least one individual weak order, then X2 cannot be equivalent
to X1 w.r.t. the social weak order.
Weak unanimity for choice procedures says that whenever all individual paired com-
parisons favor alternative i, then {i} is the social choice set. Weak unanimity for ranking
procedures says that whenever all individual paired comparisons agree with a fixed linear
order, then it is taken as the social one.
Closeness to unanimity essentially specifies a concrete voting procedure which follows.
Let U (i) be the set of all profiles where i is the top alternative in all constituent linear
orders. For a given profileA, those alternatives i are chosen which minimize the inversion
distance betweenA and U (i). As usual, this distance is defined as that betweenA and the
nearest member of U (i) and equals the number of differently ordered pairs of alternatives.
Table 1 presents only one characterization [29] based on resolving optimization prob-
lems. In fact, these are numerous. One of the most interesting results of this nature is as
follows.
The Borda method can be characterized [80] as the point method which maximizes
(among all point methods) the proportion of profiles for which the social preferences agree
with those of the majority vote (viz., with the majority winner on a pair of alternatives, or
with the Condorcet winner, or with the Condorcet ordering, provided that the latter two
exist). A related characterization of the Borda choice function was obtained by Fishburn
and Gehrlein [39]. Some other characterizations involving optimization are dealt with
in [19, 13, 14, 18]; [13] also describes some statistical procedures resulting in Borda-like
scores.
Permutation-independence and substitution-independence axioms. Ano-
nymity and neutrality essentially say that no information about individuals and alterna-
tives (respectively) except for the preference profile is used to derive the social preferences.
More formally, they require the social preference operator to be stable to any permutation
of individuals and commutative with any permutation of alternatives.
Suppose that there exist a permutation of individuals and a permutation of alter-
natives such that their simultaneous application leaves the preference profile invariant.
Symmetry states that the corresponding alternatives must be socially equivalent in this
case.
Symmetry is very effective as applied to the voting situations like the Condorcet para-
dox. On the relationship between anonymity, neutrality and symmetry see [30, pp. 473–
474].
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Independence of symmetric substitutions says : If profile A′ is obtained from A by a
one-element swap between Cp(X ′) and Cq(X ′) (individual choices of p and q from feasible
set X ′ ⊆ X), then the social choice from X ′ must be the same for A and A′.
Individual-independence axioms. Independence of locally unaffected individuals
[40] states that if some individual is indifferent between two alternatives, then his/her
other preferences do not influence the social preference between these two alternatives.
Independence of generally unconcerned individuals says that if some individual assigns
the same score (utility) to all alternatives, then the social ordering is not affected by this
particular score. This corresponds to Debreu’s [26] strong separability condition which is
crucial for his derivation of the additive utility representation.
Independence of locally unaffected individuals plays a similar role in Fleming’s deriva-
tion of monotone summability.
Suppose that only one individual changes his/her preference relation. Separability
of individual influences applies to scoring procedures and says that the resulting differ-
ences of the scores of alternatives solely depend on that individual’s previous and new
preferences and are indifferent to the other individuals’ preferences.
Alternative-independence axioms. Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives (‘IIA’ in Table 1) says that the application of the social preference to any subset of
the set of alternatives solely depends on the restriction of the individual profile to this
subset.
Strengthened IIA says that after the removal of any alternative, the social preference
coincides with the initial one applied to the subset of remaining alternatives, provided
that the individual preferences do not change.
As distinct from IIA, strengthened IIA implies that the set (and the number) of
alternatives may vary.
Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (NIIA in Table 1) says that whenever
X ′ and X ′′ ⊂ X ′ are two sets of alternatives such that X ′′ contains some alternatives
chosen from X ′, then exactly these alternatives constitute the choice from X ′′.
Nash applied this condition to one-element choice, and the more general above for-
mulation is due to Arrow.
Note that IIA is met by (and enters characterizations of) most scoring methods that
operate on individual utilities but is not satisfied by many scoring methods dealing with
binary relations (including valued relations). This is due to the very relative nature of
binary relations which causes some loss of information involving a subset of alternatives as
a profile is restricted to the subset. The following observation clarifies the point. Consider
the restrictions of an individual profile to two complementary subsets of alternatives.
Then the initial profile can be retrieved from these two restrictions provided that it
consists of utilities and cannot be if it comprises binary relations. From this point, the
variable electorate axioms are more appropriate in the case of binary relations, since no
information is lost when the profile is divided into parts corresponding to disjoint sets of
individuals. The same can be said of the profiles that consist of choice functions.
The record ‘a relaxed IIA’ stands for various relaxations of IIA. The following two
axioms combine relaxed IIA with a positive relation to social preferences.
Independence of Pareto dominated alternatives says that removing Pareto dominated
alternatives does not alter the social choice.
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Independence of the Pareto inferior alternative states the same concerning the alter-
native that is Pareto dominated by every other one.
Independence of extreme alternatives is a close condition which, unlike the previous
two axioms, does not imply any ‘positive relation to social preferences’. It says that unan-
imously superior as well as unanimously inferior subsets of alternatives can be discarded
without changing the order on the remaining alternatives.
The following axiom embodies a similar idea applied to one individual’s preferences.
Suppose that some individual ranks alternative z ahead both x and y or behind both
x and y, and then moves z to another position which is also not between x and y and not
the same with x or y. Strong positional independence for the profiles of weak orders [42]
says that such a shift does not change the social relation between x and y.
Dissolution [30] introduces acceptable dissolution procedures (we do not specify them
here) for breaking ties in the individual profiles of weak orders and says that the social
binary relation for a given profile must contain the common part of social binary relations
derived for all acceptable dissolutions of the profile.
A similar idea has been exploited in [62].
Young and Levenglick [86] use a peculiar axiom which combines independence and
positive reaction. In Table 1 it reads as ‘the order of immediately successive alternatives
obeys majority vote’. This regards every two alternatives immediately successive in one
of the derived social linear orders.
Independence axioms involving preference relativity. Independence of the
individual zeros (of utility) requires that the social ordering over X remain unchanged
when each individual’s utility function vp(x), x ∈ X, p = 1, . . . ,m is replaced by v
′
p(x) =
vp(x) + cp with any c1, . . . , cm.
Independence of the common zero and independence of the common unit (of utility)
respectively mean the invariance of the social ordering with respect to arbitrary transfor-
mations v′p(x) = vp(x) + c, c ∈ R and v
′
p(x) = bp(x), b > 0, p = 1, . . . ,m, x ∈ X .
Independence of cycles states that the choice set (respectively, the resulting ordering)
does not alter whenever any cycle in any input preference relation is reversed. Indepen-
dence of circuits and independence of alternated cycles are variations of this axiom.
The following condition is closely related to independence axioms. In the case of
ordinary binary relations it can be termed ‘majority equivalence’, whereas in the case of
valued relations it bears the spirit of additivity.
Cancellation for procedures that operate on profiles of binary preferences states that
if for every i and j, sum of the entries of the relations on (i, j) is equal to that on (j, i),
then all alternatives are socially equivalent. For ordinary binary relations, ‘sum of the
relations on (i, j)’ reduces to the number of individuals that prefer i to j.
Other profile transformation axioms. Note that monotonicity and independence
conditions are profile transformation axioms. Here we present such transformation con-
ditions that bear neither positive response nor independence.
Duality states that the reversal of all individual preference relations cannot preserve
any formerly chosen alternative in the social choice set, unless the initial social choice set
coincides with X .
Inversion says that the social weak order derived after the above transformation is
the reversed initial one.
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Suppose that the alternatives are identified with the vectors of individual utilities
attached to them. Then every set in Rm can be considered as a set of alternatives. Let ϕ
be a social choice procedure which indicates one ‘best’ alternative (point in Rm) in each
set that belongs to its domain.
Linearity with respect to sets means that for every V ′, V ′′ ∈ Rm, if V ′ and V ′′ belong
to the domain of a social choice procedure ϕ, then for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, λV ′ + (1 − λ)V ′′
also belongs to the domain of ϕ and ϕ(λV ′+(1−λ)V ′′) = λϕ(V ′)+ (1−λ)ϕ(V ′′). Here
λV ′ + (1 − λ)V ′′ designates {λv′+(1− λ)v′′ | v′ ∈ V ′,v′′ ∈ V ′′}.
This axiom can be given a probabilistic interpretation. If tomorrow one will have
to choose from V ′ or V ′′ with probabilities λ and 1 − λ, respectively, then within the
von Neumann-Morgenstern framework, λV ′ + (1 − λ)V ′′ is the set of all expected utility
allocations which are now feasible. Thus, linearity w.r.t. sets says that the today’s chosen
utility allocation should be equal to the expectation of the tomorrow’s allocation.
Additivity with respect to sets is a close property saying that for any admissible V ′
and V ′′, V ′+V ′′ (i.e., 1 ·V ′+1 ·V ′′) is also admissible and ϕ(V ′+V ′′) = ϕ(V ′)+ϕ(V ′′).
Commutativity with translations reads as the application of additivity w.r.t. sets when
one of the sets is a singleton: ϕ(V + {v}) = ϕ(V )+ v for all admissible V and all v ∈ Rm.
Expected utility axioms. As Myerson [65] demonstrated and as we saw above,
linearity with respect to sets has a natural interpretation in terms of expected utility.
In general, if an aggregation procedure takes each profile of expected utility functions
to an expected utility function, the linearity of this procedure follows under rather weak
conditions (namely, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms and Pareto indifference are
sufficient). Harsanyi [46] was the first to show this (see also [68, 51, 37]). An excellent
philosophical justification of the underlying model is given in [47, 48]. The entire book
[77] is very valuable for the comprehension of utilitarianism.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms [81] can be summarized (in the form of
Marschak postulates [57]) as follows. The relation of preference is a weak order () defined
on a set of alternatives (prospects); this set is closed w.r.t. taking lotteries (probabilistic
mixtures) of its members; there are at least four mutually nonindifferent prospects; if
x  y  z then there exists a mixture of x and z such as to be exactly indifferent to y; if
x and x′ are indifferent, then, for any prospect y, any mixture of x and y is indifferent to
the mixture of x′ and y with the same probabilities.
The Expected utility assumption of [51] states that both the individual scores of al-
ternatives and the social scores are expected utilities subject to the same underlying
probabilistic model. Essentially, this means that the feasible alternatives are lotteries
over certain outcomes.
In fact, Harsanyi’s theorem (as well as more recent Keeney’s theorem [51] and the
result in [37]) can be considered as a realization of the program outlined by Fleming
[40, p. 380] on translating his own result into the expected utility framework. On the
connections between these two results see [41].
Strategy-proofness means in [4] that if the social scores (properly normalized) are
considered as the probabilities of the alternatives in a lottery, and each individual has
a cardinal utility function that induces her personal ordering, then no individual can
increase her expected utility in the resulting lottery by misrepresenting her true ordering.
Other axioms. Suppose that the individual profile consists of utility functions
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v1(i), . . . , vm(i) on X , v = (v1(i), . . . , vm(i)) is a utility mapping, V is the set of admissible
utility mappings, and ϕ is a procedure that takes each v ∈ V to an ordering R over X .
Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ R
m. Suppose R+(x) is the set of y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ R
m such
that for some admissible utility mapping v ∈ V , (x1, . . . , xm) and (y1, . . . , ym) are the
vectors of individual utilities of some alternatives i ∈ X and j ∈ X , respectively, and iRj,
where R = ϕ(v). The set R−(x) is defined by replacing ‘iRj’ with ‘jRi’ in the definition
of R+(x). Continuity states that the sets R+(x) and R−(x) are closed for all x ∈ Rm.
It follows from Debreu’s teorem [25] that this axiom implies the representability of ϕ
by a continuous function of v1(i), . . . , vm(i).
Roberts [70] exploits another condition, weak continuity, which says that for every ad-
missible utility mapping v = (v1(i), . . . , vm(i)), there exists an admissible utility mapping
v′ = (v′1(i), . . . , v
′
m(i)) that is close to v as much as desired and such that v
′
p(i) < vp(i)
for all i and p and ϕ(v′) = ϕ(v).
A scoring procedure satisfies summability if there exists a function w such that the
scores of alternatives can be represented as
si =
m∑
p=1
w(A(p), i), i = 1, . . . , n.
Summability of a ranking (choice) procedure means that the social order (choice) is de-
termined by a summable scoring procedure.
This condition is the crucial axiom in [42] and simultaneously is closely related to
the procedures characterized in [40, 31, 58] and point ranking procedures characterized
in [79, 30, 84, 4] and generalized in [66].
The idea of ‘minimal equity’ is that the social ranking procedure is not always based
on the most optimistic estimates of alternatives (in other terms, on the preferences of
the best off individual). Specifically, suppose i, j ∈ X and there exists p ∈ M such that
vp(j) > vp(i) whereas for all other q ∈ M , vq(j) < vq(i) < vp(i). Minimal equity says
that the social ranking procedure is not one always preferring j in such situations.
Thus, the characterization results rest upon:
• Reinforcement or elimination (sometimes supplemented by overwhelming majority)
[79, 30, 83, 84, 45, 35, 69, 67, 86, 63, 85, 72, 24, 66, 55, 56].
• Pareto principle for equicardinal subsets [31, 34].
• Closeness to unanimity [29].
• Independence of cycles and its variations [49, 8, 9, 10].
• Independence of locally unaffected individuals [40].
• Relaxations of IIA [71, 49]. Sometimes these conditions combine with summability
[42], elimination [30], reinforcement [86, 69, 85] and its weak version [62].
• Additivity [6], additivity w.r.t. sets [64], linearity w.r.t. sets [65], commutativity
with translations [64].
P. Yu. Chebotarev and E. Shamis / Characterizations of scoring methods 17
• IIA applied to utility functions along with scale invariance conditions [43, 7, 61, 2,
58, 27, 70]. In a discrete context, this approach is applied in [43, 28].
• Expected utility axioms [46, 51, 37].
• An expected utility version of strategy-proofness [4].
• Among other axioms we mention
– Axioms of positive relation between individual and social preferences (Pareto
principle, monotonicity, independence of Pareto dominated/ Pareto inferior
alternatives, weak unanimity, faithfulness) which occur in almost all charac-
terizations.
– independence of generally unconcerned individuals [58, 27, 70] which, as well
as independence of locally unaffected individuals and Pareto indifference (to
some extent), can help separate individual variables.
– Cancellation [83, 67, 24, 55, 56].
– Disjoint equality [35].
– Independence of symmetric substitutions [3].
– Symmetry, contraction, dissolution [30].
– Inversion [30] and duality [63].
– Summability and stability [42].
– Continuity [58] and weak continuity [70].
– Minimal equity [27].
– Implicit form of scores [12, 15] whose generalization will be discussed in Sec-
tion 5.
3.4 Resulting methods
The last column of Table 1 requires some definitions. We represent individual binary
relations (both ordinary and valued ones) by matrices of paired comparisons A(p) = (apij),
p = 1, . . . , n. When the input preference relation is single, one matrix A = (aij) can be
substituted for A(p). As distinct from all other sections of this paper, now we do not
assume apij + a
p
ji = 1 for j 6= i. For ordinary relations R
p,
apij =
{
1, (i, j) ∈ Rp and (j, i) /∈ Rp
0, otherwise.
First, we introduce a rather general form of scores used in the methods of Table 1.
Extended Borda scores are defined as follows:
si =
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(apij − a
p
ji), i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
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The idea of summing differences (apij−a
p
ji) is due to Copeland [20] (see also [54]), but
conventionally his name is only attributed to such scores derived from a single relation,
particularly from that of simple majority. We follow this tradition.
Extended Borda ordering and extended Borda choice designate in Table 1 various
instances of ranking and choice induced by the extended Borda scores, provided that they
have no proper name. Specifically, Borda choice and Borda ordering are the instances
where the individual profile consists of linear orders. When a choice function is concerned,
the Borda (or Copeland) choice may have absolute (‘broad’) or relative (‘narrow’) form
[75], depending on whether the score is counted over the whole set of alternatives or over
its presented subset.
The scores
si =
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
apij , i = 1, . . . , n
and
si =
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(−apji), i = 1, . . . , n
are referred to as down-sided and up-sided Borda scores, respectively. For profiles of
linear orders, they are equivalent to the extended Borda scores up to a positive affine
transformation. In this case, the term ‘Borda score’ is used. Factored Borda scores are
also equivalent to the extended Borda scores on all profiles of linear orders. In the case
of weak orders, they are defined as follows:
si =
m∑
p=1
spi , i = 1, . . . , n,
where
s
p
i = card{k | ∃i1, . . . , ik ∈ X : i ≻p i1 ≻p · · · ≻p ik}
and ≻ p is the strict preference of the pth individual. The properties of these and some
other extensions of the Borda scores to the profiles of weak orders are studied in [42].
Suppose that the preference profile consists of individuals’ choice sets. Note that
they can be represented by weak orders with exactly two ‘strata’ (classes of equivalent
alternatives). In this case, the factored Borda scores are approval voting scores. They
equal the numbers of supporting individuals.
For profiles consisting of linear orders, down-sided Borda scores are generalized in
two ways. The scores
si =
m∑
p=1
α(
∑
j 6=i
apij), i = 1, . . . , n
with α(·) nonnegative and nondecreasing7 real-valued function, are point scores. Function
α(·) defines the ‘points’ assigned to an alternative i for each position in individual orders.
If each position except for the highest one is assigned a zero point, then plurality scores
result. Transfinite point ordering allows transfinite ‘points’ which need not satisfy the
Archimedian property. Composite point ordering results when one has several different
7Note that in some characterizations these properties are not derived
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vectors of point scores (determined by different α’s) and applies them successively, for
breaking ties that survived. In fact, transfinite point orderings and composite point
orderings give rise to the same family of aggregation operators (see [79]). At composite
point choice, the point scores are used to refine the choice. As distinct from the point
ordering, ranking by the sum of arbitrary scores (utilities) that represent individual orders
is generally neither anonymous nor neutral. A utility function v : X → R represents a
weak order  on X iff ∀i, j ∈ X , i  j⇔ v(i) ≥ v(j).
The scores
si =
∑
j 6=i
β(
m∑
p=1
apij), i = 1, . . . , n
with β(·) nonnegative and nondecreasing real-valued function, are lobby size scores (sup-
porting size scores in [4]). Function β(·) defines the partial scores assigned to i for each
size of a ‘lobby’ (coalition) supporting i against j. This is another generalization of
down-sided Borda scores.
The most general Borda-like scores for profiles of linear orders are provided by convex
combinations of point scores and lobby size scores:
si = ν
m∑
p=1
α(
∑
j 6=i
apij) + (1 − ν)
∑
j 6=i
β(
m∑
p=1
apij), i = 1, . . . , n,
where 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. The same approach can be applied to the extended Borda scores as
well.
Partial ordering of permuted dominance is an interesting procedure introduced in
[30] as follows. Alternative i nonstrictly dominates j iff there exists a permutation σ
of individuals and, for each individual p, permutations σp of alternatives such that for
every alternative k, apik ≥ a
σ(p)
j σ
p
(k). This definition is not perfectly constructive, and the
authors give an algorithm for obtaining this partial ordering, characterize it (see Table 1)
and thoroughly study its properties. The partial ordering of permuted dominance is
not generated by any scoring procedure but it is the intersection of all point orderings.
We present it here mainly because its definition is related to our self-consistency axiom
(Section 4).
Generalized row sums make up a parametric family of scores that coincide with the
extended Borda scores on complete preference structures and generally satisfy specific
systems of linear equations.
Finally, Kemeny median consists of all social orderings that are nearest to the indi-
vidual preferences in the metrics ‘sum of absolute differences at all pairs of alternatives’.
This ranking procedure is not based on scores, and we included it because its charac-
terizations are closely related to those of scoring methods. As Young [85] revealed, this
median approach had been initially proposed in a vague form by Condorcet.
Thus, the last column of Table 1 induces the following classification of the axiomatic
characterizations. The scoring, ranking and choice procedures in Table 1 are based on:
• Various manifestations of the extended Borda scores [62, 42, 30, 83, 45, 29, 4, 71,
67, 49, 85, 72, 6, 24, 8, 9, 55, 56].
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• Generalized row sums [12, 15].
• Down-sided, up-sided and factored Borda scores for profiles of weak orders and
valued relations:
– Down-sided Borda scores [28].
– Meet of down-sided and up-sided Borda orderings [10].
– Factored Borda scores [62, 63]; scores of approval voting [35, 36, 3].
• Point scores and lobby size scores:
– Point scores [79, 30, 84, 4]; plurality scores [69, 63].
– Partial ordering of permuted dominance [30].
– Composite point scores [79, 84].
– Transfinite point scores [30].
– Lobby size scores [4].
– Convex combinations of point scores and lobby size scores [4].
• Sum of arbitrary scores (utilities) that represent individual orders [40, 31, 34].
• Aggregation functions for individual utilities v1(x), . . . , vm(x):
– Utilitarian function
∑m
p=1 vp(x) (counterpart of the extended Borda scores)
[43, 61, 2, 58, 27, 64].
– Weighted utilitarian functions
∑m
p=1 αp vp(x) +β [7, 46, 51, 70, 65] (β 6≡ 0
in [46]).
– Generalized utilitarian functions signβ
∑m
p=1 αp(vp(x))
β and∑m
p=1 αp log(vp(x)) [70].
– Anonymous separable functions
∑m
p=1 w(vp(x)) with continuous and increasing
w (analog of point scores) and continuous separable functions
∑m
p=1 wp(vp(x))
[58].
– Homothetic and increasing functionsW (v1(x),...,vm(x)) and special cases with
homogeneous of degree 1 functions [70], see also [82, 52].
– Increasing and/or continuous or arbitrary functionsW (v1(x),...,vm(x)) [43, 58,
70].
• Sum of arbitrary scores determined by individuals’ ballots [66].
• Kemeny median [86, 85].
Let us mention two other related families of procedures based on scores, first, the
generalized positional voting methods by Saari [73, 74]. The choice is determined by point
scores but in a more complicated (and still quite natural) way involving multiple com-
parisons of score differences and score sums with thresholds. Ordinary choice procedures
based on scores are included. Saari characterizes this family, and the key axiom is weak
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reinforcement: C(A) = C(A′)⇒ C(A+A′) = C(A) = C(A′), where C(A) is the choice
set. Merlin [60] demonstrates that a version of this axiom (and of a medium condition,
inclusive reinforcement: C(A) ⊆ C(A′)⇒ C(A+A′) = C(A)), where C(A) is the set of
chosen linear orders, holds for a family of runoff ranking procedures based on scores. Here
at each stage, some kind of point scores (for example, Borda scores or plurality scores)
is counted for a restricted set of alternatives, i.e., for truncated preferences. The restric-
tion of the set of alternatives is done by eliminating from consideration low scoring (or
high scoring) alternatives which are thereby ordered. Characterizations of runoff choice
procedures by Hare, Coombs and Nanson are given in [59].
3.5 Types of preference aggregation procedures
An overall scheme of preference aggregation is depicted in Fig. 1. Block ‘C’ is the main
common feature of the scoring methods presented in Table 1. Indeed, the very term
‘scoring’ means ‘calculating some numerical indices of performance’. The methods vary
in their starting point (A or B1 or B2), destination (C or D) and route between them.
Preferences
of individuals
Individuals’ utility
functions derived from
their preferences vp(x),
p = 1, . . . ,m, x ∈ X
(or scores sp
1
, . . . , spn)
Scores evaluating
aggregate paired
comparisons of
alternatives
v′(x, y), x, y ∈ X
Social utility
function v(x), x ∈ X
(or scores s1, . . . , sn)
Social
ranking or
choice
A
B1
B2
C D
✲
 ✒
❅❘
❄
✻
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅❅❘
 
 
 
 
  ✒
✲
v(x) =W (v1(x), . . . , vm(x))
v(x) =W ′(v′(x, 1), . . . , v′(x,n))
Figure 1: An overall scheme of preference aggregation
A→B1→C→D. This is a prevalent route [40, 31, 62, 79, 34, 30, 84, 35, 69, 63, 3, 66].
The most general result is that given by Myerson [66] where individual ballots are members
of an arbitrary nonempty and finite set. They even need not be structures on the set of
conceivable alternatives. For example, they may be some colors (red, rose, brown, green,
etc.) representing various political orientations. Each ballot induces some scores of the
available alternatives (these scores can be assigned by the planner); then the scores are
summed up over individuals to give the ultimate scores of alternatives. Anonymity and
some kind of neutrality are assumed.
Other highly general results are provided by Fleming [40] and Fishburn [31, 34].
Here, individual preferences are represented by binary relations, and the social preference
structure is determined by the sums of arbitrary scores (utilities) that monotonically
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represent the individual relations. From the beginning, neither neutrality nor anonymity
is imposed, but then Fishburn [34] studies the impact of these conditions in the framework
of social choice functions.
Point scoring methods are the neutral and anonymous variant of such procedures.
They have transfinite and composite extensions [79, 30, 84].
In [62, 35, 69, 63, 3] specific scoring methods including plurality choice, approval
voting and factored Borda method are characterized.
A→B→C→D. Definition (1) of extended Borda scores involves two sums which can
be written in either order. Consequently, the corresponding scoring methods (as well as
those based on down-sided or up-sided Borda scores) may take either A→B1→C→D or
A→B2→C→D route. A→B→C→D is their common designation. Such scoring methods
are characterized in [62, 42, 30, 83, 45, 29, 71, 67, 49, 85, 72, 6, 24, 8, 9, 10, 28, 55]. In
some of these papers, the input preference structure is single binary relation (or weighted
relation). It can be thought of as representing the preferences of a single individual (the
corresponding scheme (A=B1)→(B2=C)→D results when ‘B’ is divided into ‘B2’ and
‘B1’ in A→B→C→D) or as an aggregate preference relation, e.g., majority relation. The
latter route is
B2→C→D, and the papers are [71, 49, 6, 8, 9, 10].
B1→C→D. This route (A=B1 is usually implied) is typical of welfare economics and
game theory. The procedures characterized in [43, 7, 61, 46, 2, 58, 27, 70, 65, 64, 82, 52]
are listed in subsection 3.4. For other related results and a more general context we refer
to [76, 1, 38, 64].
A→B1→C, A→B2→C and A→B1,B2→C are represented by the characteriza-
tions of point scores, lobby size scores and their convex combinations in [4]. The gen-
eralized row sum method [12, 15] allows an A→B1,B2→C representation (as well as
many other indirect scoring procedures; some of them—in versions suitable for complete
preferences—are presented in Table 2).
A→B→C corresponds to the extended Borda scores [4, 56].
A→C. This is for indirect scoring methods whose ultimate scores cannot be repre-
sented through B1 and B2 structures.
B1→C applies to [51].
A→B2→D. Kemeny median characterized in [86, 85] does not need calculating any
social scores (‘C’). This method is presented in Table 1 since its characterization has much
common with those of scoring methods.
B2→D. We refer to the recent monograph [53] for a comprehensive study of such
methods. The approach ‘based on social binary comparisons of alternatives’ is compared
with the ‘positional’ approach in [32, 75, 42, 30, 74].
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The last issue we touch on in this section is: How do the presented characterizations of
scoring methods that operate on individual orders and individual utilities help characterize
indirect scoring procedures intended for arbitrary paired comparisons?
First, as [67, 85, 24] demonstrate, the classical Young’s characterization of the Borda
method can be adapted for arbitrary paired comparisons. The way of exploring further
variations of the axioms involved seems very promising.
Further, note that the numerical paired comparisons have the same relation to in-
dividual utilities as two-valued paired comparisons do to individual orders. This clears
the way of interpreting and adjusting the results of utility aggregation for the paired
comparison context.
Another approach is suggested by Myerson’s [66] result. In case we accept the con-
ditions of Myerson’s theorem, we have to admit that the aggregation of individual paired
comparisons must be based on summing up some utilities derived from the ballots. Then
the only problem remains to introduce proper individual scores that represent paired
comparisons. The corresponding characterization problems seem to be less complicated
than the initial ones.
It is worth mentioning, however, that no scoring procedure that operates on incom-
plete paired comparisons and satisfies self-consistency, neutrality and anonymity can be
represented as A→B1→C [17].
The procedures we characterize in the reminder of the paper operate on profiles of
valued and ordinary binary relations and result in scores (A→C type). We use a unique
axiom called self-consistency. It is introduced in the following section and belongs to
the ‘positive relation’ group (its version applicable to ranking procedures was explored
in [18]). The scoring procedures that satisfy self-consistency are turned out to have a
monotone implicit form (Sections 5, 6).
4 Self-consistency
If the scores generated by a scoring procedure are intended to serve as numerical estimates
of the alternatives, they should be comparable. This means that whenever we consider i
to ‘perform better’ than j, the score of i should be greater, whether they are taken from
the same or from different profiles.
Let a scoring procedure ϕ be fixed, so the score vector (s1, . . . , sn) is determined for
every A ∈ A .
The idea of the following axiom is simple. If i got better comparison results than
j and the opponents of i are assigned respectively higher score than those of j, then
the score of i should be greater than the score of j. To formalize this requirement, we
introduce some special notation. Recall that M = {1, . . . ,m} and Xi = {1, . . . , n}r {i},
i = 1, . . . , n (Section 2).
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Definition 1 (Performance multiset)
The multiset8 Ui = {(a
p
ik, sk) | k ∈ Xi, p ∈ M} of pairs (a
p
ik, sk) corresponding to all
comparison outcomes of i in A will be referred to as the performance multiset of i in A.
Let A and A′ be two admissible profiles of individual preferences. Suppose Ui and
U ′j are the performance multisets of i in A and j in A
′, respectively.
Definition 2 (Majorization)
Alternative i in A majorizes j in A′ if there exists a one-to-one mapping µ from Ui onto
U ′j such that µ
(
(apik, sk)
)
= (a′qjℓ, s
′
ℓ) implies a
p
ik ≥ a
′q
jℓ and sk ≥ s
′
ℓ. Furthermore, i in A
strictly majorizes j in A′ if, in addition, at least one of the above inequalities is strict for
at least one comparison outcome apik.
Axiom 3 (Self-consistency)
1. If i in A majorizes j in A′ then si ≥ s
′
j.
2. If i in A strictly majorizes j in A′ then si > s
′
j.
It can be said that a scoring procedure is self-consistent when it preserves majoriza-
tion. In other words, this axiom is a kind of Pareto condition with a self-consistent
version of superiority which allows permutations and inter-profile juxtapositions. Among
the axioms of the previous section, self-consistency is related with the Pareto principle
for equicardinal subsets [31, 34], permuted dominance [33] and especially with its version
exploited in [30]. As distinct from them, self-consistency applies to A→C aggregation pro-
cedures, which enables it to capture interprofile comparisons. Besides, self-consistency is
weaker in that it only recognizes the superiority in comparison outcomes confirmed by
exceeding scores of the ‘opponents’.
Self-consistency is illustrated in Fig. 2 where only comparison outcomes of i and j
are shown. Ui = {(0, sa), (1, sc), (1, se)} and U
′
j = {(0, s
′
b), (1, s
′
d), (0, s
′
f )}. If sa ≥ s
′
b,
sc ≥ s
′
d, and se ≥ s
′
f , then i in A strictly majorizes j in A
′ with the following µ:
µ
(
(0, sa)
)
= (0, s′b), µ
(
(1, sc)
)
= (1, s′d), µ
(
(0, sa)
)
= (0, s′f ). Then self-consistency
requires si > s
′
j .
5 Monotone implicit form
Now consider scoring procedures of different nature. They came from such disciplines as
management science, psychometrics, applied statistics, processing of sport tournaments,
graph theory, etc., and are based on the resolution of systems of algebraic equations. The
number of equations is the number of alternatives and the form of them is presented for
several procedures in Table 2. Five of them were rediscovered for several times and with
different motivations. In the first column we give only the earliest references we know,
other ones can be found in [16, 17]. In Table 2 these procedures are adjusted to the
8For multisets, as distinct from sets, multiple occurrence of elements is allowed. Ui is a
multiset since the numerical pairs (ap
ik
, sk) may coincide for different k and p
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Figure 2: An illustration to self-consistency
type of data considered here. The domain of them not necessarily contains all possible
profiles, but this subject is out of our scope now. The method by Smith and Gulliksen
was designed for incomplete preference data.
The common idea of these procedures is to process comparison outcomes taking into
account the strength of competing alternatives which (strength) is estimated through
their ‘performance’ in the same profile. In this sense, these methods are self-consistent.
A relation to the axiom of the same name is conveyed by the following theorem.
It is easily seen that each equation in Table 2 has the form
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
h(apij , sj , si) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (2)
where h(·, ·, ·) strictly increases in apij (recall that a
p
ij + a
p
ji = 1, j 6= i, p = 1, . . . ,m, as
assumed in Section 2) and in sj and strictly decreases in si. These properties of h(·, ·, ·) can
be intuitively motivated as follows: The greater comparison outcomes apij and ‘strengths
of opponents’ sj alternative i has, the greater should be its own ‘strength’ si (to provide
the zero sum on the left-hand side).
A form close to (2) was used as an axiom to derive the generalized row sum method
in [12, 15]. It can be noted however that this form is somewhat too special because of
the double sum on the left-hand side. Let us replace this sum with an arbitrary strictly
increasing function.
Let T be the set of all multisets that consist of m(n− 1) real triples.
Definition 4 (Monotone implicit form of scoring procedure)
A scoring procedure ϕ : A → Rn has a monotone implicit form if there exists a function
g : T → R such that
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Table 2
Some sensitive scoring procedures
Paper ith equation of n equations Requirements or corollaries
Zermelo [87]
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(
apij −
si
si+sj
)
= 0 si > 0,
n∑
i=1
si = 1
Katz [50]
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
apij
(
ε sj +1−
si
m(n− 1)
)
= 0 ε > 0, si > 0
Smith [78],
Gulliksen [44]
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(
mn(apij − a
p
ji) + sj −si
)
= 0
n∑
i=1
si = 0
Daniels [23]
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(apijsj −a
p
jisi) = 0 si > 0
Daniels [23]
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(
apij
sj
si
− apji
si
sj
)
= 0 si > 0
Cowden [22]
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(apijsj(1− si)− a
p
jisi(1− sj)) = 0 si > 0
(i) for every profile A ∈ A , the scores satisfy the system of equations
g
(
{(apij , sj , si) | j ∈ Xi, p ∈M}
)
= 0, i = 1, . . . , n; (3)
(ii) g strictly increases in every apij and sj and strictly decreases in si.
This form is a direct generalization of (2).
6 Self-consistency amounts to the existence of a monotone implicit form
Theorem 5
A scoring procedure ϕ is self-consistent if and only if it has a monotone implicit form.
The ‘if’ part of the theorem is an easy consequence of the corresponding definitions
(see the proof). The converse statement is not so trivial. Below it is reduced to the
fact that every bounded function defined on any ‘Paretian subset’ of Rk has a strictly
monotonic extension to the Rk (Lemma 6). In fact, we need a special case of Lemma 6,
but its general formulation has essentially the same proof and is worth mentioning by
itself.
Prior to proving Theorem 5, note that the extended Borda scores (1) trivially satisfy
self-consistency (the proof is left to the reader). By Theorem 5, this procedure must have
a monotone implicit form. Indeed, as shown in [12, 15], a one-parametric family of such
forms is provided by the generalized row sum method:
∑
j 6=i
m∑
p=1
(γ(apij − a
p
ji)− (si−sj))− si ε
−1 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (4)
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where ε > 0 is a positive parameter and γ = ε−1+mn. The least squares procedure by
Smith [78] and Gulliksen [44] presented in Table 2 provides another form which can be
obtained from (4) as ε→∞.
Proof
Let ϕ be a scoring procedure such that there exists g : T → R having the properties (i)
and (ii) of monotone implicit form. Prove that ϕ is self-consistent.
Suppose that i in A majorizes j in A′. Then there exists a one-to-one mapping µ
from Ui onto U
′
j such that µ
(
(apik, sk)
)
= (a′qjℓ, s
′
ℓ) implies a
p
ik ≥ a
′q
jℓ and sk ≥ s
′
ℓ. Assume
that si < s
′
j . Then by (ii) the left-hand side of the ith equation of (3) written for A is
greater than the left-hand side of the jth equation of (3) written for A′ and they cannot
be both equal to zero. Hence si ≥ s
′
j and item 1 of self-consistency is satisfied. Item 2 is
proved similarly.
Now suppose that ϕ is self-consistent. Prove that there exists a function g : T → R
satisfying (i) and (ii).
Let us say that a set P ⊂ Rk, k ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .} is a Paretian subset of Rk if for
any (z, z′) ∈ P 2, either z = z′ or there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that zi > z
′
i.
For every profile A ∈ A and every alternative i, the multiset {(a
p
ij , sj ,−si) | j ∈
Xi, p ∈ M}, where a
p
ij are the comparison outcomes of i in A and si, sj are the scores
assigned by ϕ, will be called the multiset of comparison triples of i in A.
Let Pϕ ⊂ R
t where t = 3m(n − 1) be the set of all vectors z = (z1, z2, . . . , zt) such
that the multiset {(z1, z2, z3), (z4, z5, z6), . . . , (zt−2, zt−1, zt)} is the multiset of comparison
triples of some alternative in some profile A ∈ A . It follows from self-consistency that
Pϕ is a Paretian subset.
Lemma 6
Suppose P is a Paretian subset of Rk, k ∈ N . For every bounded function fP (x) : P →
R, there exists a function f(x) : Rk → R such that
(∗) The restriction of f(x) to P coincides with fP (x) and
(∗∗) f(x) is strictly increasing in every component of x: x1, . . . , xk.
Proof
1. Prove Lemma 6 for the open hypercube9 L =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xk)
∣∣∣ |xi | < 1, i =
1, . . . , k
}
substituted for the Euclidean space Rk. After that the general case of Rk will
be reduced to this one.
Introduce the following notation.
For any x,y ∈ L, x ≥ y means ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} xi ≥ yi.
For every x ∈ L, let
D(x) =
{
y ∈ L
∣∣∣ x ≥ y} ∪ (Rk rL),
U(x) =
{
y ∈ L
∣∣∣ y ≥ x} ∪ (Rk rL).
9i, j and k in the proof of Lemma 6 have nothing in common with the same variables that
denote alternatives
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For any Y ⊆ L, let
D(Y ) =
⋃
x∈Y
D(x),
U(Y ) =
⋃
x∈Y
U(x).
Suppose ei is the unit vector of the ith axis of Rk; D = D(P ), U = U(P ). Suppose
that Fmin, Fmax ∈ R are such that for any x ∈ P , Fmin ≤ fP (x) ≤ Fmax holds (recall
that fP (x) in Lemma 6 is bounded). Define several auxiliary functions on L.
di(x) = inf
{
d ≥ 0
∣∣∣ x−d ei ∈ D}, i = 1, . . . , k,
ui(x) = inf
{
u ≥ 0
∣∣∣ x+u ei ∈ U}, i = 1, . . . , k.
For every x ∈ L define
f1(x) =
k∑
i=1
di(x)−
k∑
i=1
ui(x),
f2(x) =


Fmin, x ∈ L ∩D r U
Fmax, x ∈ L ∩ U rD
1
2 (Fmin+Fmax), x ∈ Lr (D ∪ U)
fP (x), x ∈ L ∩D ∩ U = P,
and finally,
f(x) = f1(x) + f2(x).
Now we prove that f(x) possesses the desired properties (∗) and (∗∗). First, note
that di(x) and ui(x), i = 1, . . . , n, and thus f(x) are well-defined by the definitions of D
and U .
(∗) For any x ∈ P , f(x) = fP (x) since ∀x ∈ P d
i(x) = ui(x) = 0, and f2(x) =
fP (x).
(∗∗) Prove that f(x) is strictly increasing on L in every xi. It suffices to show that
for any x ∈ L, α > 0, and i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
x′ = x+α ei ∈ L implies f(x′) > f(x).
Fix i and prove three statements.
(A) di(x′)− ui(x′) > di(x)− ui(x).
It is easily seen that di(x′) ≥ di(x) and ui(x′) ≤ ui(x). Assume that di(x′) = di(x)
and ui(x′) = ui(x). Then x,x′ ∈ L∩D∩U = P . This is impossible since P is Paretian.
(B) For every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}r {i}, dj(x′) ≥ dj(x) and uj(x′) ≤ uj(x).
Assume that dj(x′) < dj(x). Then there exists d0 ≥ 0 such that x
′−d0 e
j ∈ D and
x−d0 e
j /∈ D. According to the definition of D, this is impossible, since if there exists
z ∈ P such that z ≥ x′−d0 e
j , then z ≥ x−d0 e
j and hence x−d0 e
j ∈ D; on the other
hand, if x′−d0 e
j ∈ RkrL, then x−d0 e
j ∈ Rk rL and x−d0 e
j ∈ D as well. Hence
dj(x′) ≥ dj(x). Similarly, uj(x′) ≤ uj(x).
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(C) f2(x
′) ≥ f2(x).
It is easy to verify that all possible translations of the vector x+α ei ∈ L from one
set to another as α ≥ 0 increases are specified by the following diagrams:
L ∩D r U → P = L ∩D ∩ U → L ∩ U rD or
L ∩D r U → Lr (D ∪ U) → L ∩ U rD or
L ∩D r U → L ∩ U rD.
At all these translations, f2(x) does not decrease by definition.
By (A), (B) and (C), f(x) is strictly increasing in xi on L.
2. Now let P be any Paretian subset of Rk. To extend fP (x) to R
k, we first contract
R
k onto L by the mapping y = ψ(x) where yi =
2
π
arctanxi, i = 1, . . . , k. Then solve
the problem on L and finally extend L onto Rk by y = ψ−1(x), i.e., yi = tan(
π
2xi),
i = 1, . . . , k. It is obvious that under these strictly increasing transformations, Pare-
tian subsets are mapped to Paretian subsets and strictly increasing functions to strictly
increasing functions. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
To prove Theorem 5, apply Lemma 6 to P = Pϕ. Namely, put R
k = Rt and fPϕ ≡ 0.
Then the conclusion of Lemma 6 differs from the desired statement only by that the
required function g should be defined for the multisets of real triples and should map
all multisets of comparison triples to zero, whereas function f provided by Lemma 6 is
defined on Rt and maps to zero all vectors corresponding to the multisets of comparison
triples. But note that Pϕ is invariant (by definition) to any permutation of triples of
adjacent coordinates (z3r−2, z3r−1, z3r). Then, by the proof of Lemma 6, in this case f is
also invariant to such permutations applied to its argument. This implies that the value
of f for any vector x ∈ Rt is solely determined by the multiset of adjacent triples of
coordinates x1, . . . , xt. In other words, f does not depend on the order of these triples
in (x1, . . . , xt). Therefore, f being considered as a function of such multisets of triples
defines a function g with the desired properties. This completes the proof.
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